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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Professor Burnele Powell conducted a study for the
Administrative Conference of the United States of federal agency use of
declaratory orders under § 554(e) of the federal Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).' The study resulted in two leading articles on the subject.2 He
concluded that there was a "generally unreceptive, if not hostile view of the
device" on the part of the agencies, a "sense of apprehension on the part of
the public," and "a lack of elaboration in Supreme Court opinions that have
discussed the procedure." 3 He also pointed to agencies' misconception of
their advice-giving function,4 and their failure to implement effective
advice-giving through clearly defined regulations.5
Despite Powell's invitation for more "scholarly attention to the device ,
'6
declaratory orders under § 554(e) remain curiously ignored. This tendency
becomes particularly noticeable in light of the comparatively large attention
given to petitions for rulemaking.7 While most administrative law texts
devote a separate section to cases involving petitions for rulemaking, few
1. 5 U.s.c. § 554(e) (2000) ("The agency, with like effect as in the case of other
orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy
or remove uncertainty.").
2. Burnele V. Powell, Sinners, Supplicants and Samaritans: Agency Advice Giving in
Relation to Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 N.C. L. REv. 339 (1984-
85) [hereinafter Powell I]; Burnele V. Powell, Administratively Declaring Order: Some
Practical Applications of the Administrative Procedure Act's Declaratory Order Process,
64 N.C. L REv. 277 (1986) [hereinafter Powell I].
3. Powell I, supra note 2, at 372.
4. Id. at 348-49 (noting agencies' view that advice giving is better provided in
rulemaking).
5. Id. at 344 n.18 (demonstrating the scarcity of agency procedural regulations
governing declaratory orders by the fact that only two of seven major regulatory agencies
had adopted such regulations).
6. Id. at 374.
7. See William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An
Overview of Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for
Improvement, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 1 (exploring the processes for consideration and
disposition of rulemaking petitions). Another example includes a recent Animal Law
Conference at American University that featured a panel on use of petitions for rulemaking.
(Co-sponsored by the District of Columbia Bar Association's Animal Law Committee of the
Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Section; the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining to Animals; and the Washington
College of Law, American University) (Apr. 18, 2004).
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8provide significant coverage of declaratory order cases. This is true,
despite the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the remedial effect of
§ 554(e). 9 Moreover, the low degree of interest in declaratory orders seems
less rational in light of the minimal transaction costs associated with their
issuance. 10
Twenty years after Professor Powell's original study, this Article
attempts to supplement his work by examining contemporary uses of
declarative orders, reviewing their procedural requirements and judicial
treatments, and proffering arguments for their expanded use. It also seeks
to place declaratory orders properly within the continuum of agency formal
and informal policymaking activities. This continuum consists of a broad
spectrum of administrative agency actions that include adjudication and
rulemaking. Each of these two procedures has its petition process. An
agency rulemaking, for example, can be initiated by the agency itself or
from the outside via a petition for rulemaking under § 553(e). Similarly, an
agency's declaratory order can either be initiated sua sponte or from the
outside by a petition under § 554(e). The procedural flexibility of
declaratory orders, which fit squarely within the continuum of
administrative processes, supports their prudent use by agencies.
Part I of this Article reviews the potential uses of declaratory orders,
concentrating on resolution of jurisdictional disputes, as well as some
judicial interpretations of § 554(e). Part II examines the procedural
requirements for issuing declaratory orders. Part III discusses issues
related to judicial review. Part IV suggests an amendment to the
procedures for declaratory orders in § 554(e), borrowing substantially from
the 1981 Model State APA. The Article concludes by offering suggestions
and emphasizing the merits of Professor Powell's recommendations.
This Article does not constitute a comprehensive examination of the
utility of declaratory orders. Instead, it attempts to serve as a catalyst for
8. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIvE LAW CASES
AND COMMENTS 596-609 (rev. 10th ed. 2003) (the leading text which includes a section on
petitions for rulemaking, but nothing about declaratory orders). Powell also lamented that:
There has been a decreasing amount of scholarly attention to the device, at
least as reflected by casebooks currently in use. Although no study has been
undertaken to determine the extent to which administrative law professors
emphasize the existence of the device, discussions with colleagues over the
course of the last year revealed no professor, including the author, who makes
more than a passing classroom reference to the declaratory order.
Powell I, supra note 2, at 374.
9. See Powell I, supra note 2, at 359 (explaining the Supreme Court's interpretation of
§ 554(e) as a "procedure to control bureaucratic excesses and defy the dilatory").
10. Declaratory orders can be issued in the context of an ongoing adjudication, or they
can be issued in a separate proceeding. The courts have ruled that such proceedings need
not necessarily have all the attributes of formal adjudication. Thus, the transaction costs
associated with the implementation of declaratory orders remain low.
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the discussion of lingering issues that Professor Powell insightfully raised
in his work during the 1980s.
As a fundamental premise in this exercise, we note that declaratory
orders constitute flexible, procedural tools with significant utility,
benefiting both agencies and private parties. Agencies (and regulated
parties) should therefore consider using declaratory orders to resolve
preliminary matters involving jurisdictional questions. In such cases, the
declaratory order can efficiently and expeditiously determine the
appropriate venue of pending claims or disputes, thereby reserving
resources for subsequent litigation of substantive issues associated with a
claim. Declaratory orders may also serve to quickly settle disputes with
minimal costs. These more focused uses of this procedural tool may
benefit the private party and the agency.
I. THE FUNCTIONALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECLARATORY ORDERS
A. Context and Background
The relative disuse of declaratory orders is curious given that they exist
on the menu of administrative procedures available to agencies. The
adjudicative functions and procedures of federal administrative agencies
often mirror those of their judicial counterparts. For example, agency
adjudications, 1" which constitute administrative processes that affect
individualized rights or interests, 12  often resemble judicial trials.
Administrative adjudicative proceedings often include such typical trial-
like tools as discovery, pretrial motions, and subpoena requests.
13
11. The federal statutory definition of "adjudication" relates more to process constraints
and resultant agency action. Section 551(7) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000), states that
"'adjudication' means agency process for the formulation of an order." The term "order"
consists of some final agency disposition generated in a process "other than rule making but
including licensing." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2000); see also id. § 554 (providing the required
procedures in a federal agency adjudication). For more information on what constitutes an
agency adjudication, see A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION (Michael Asimow,
ed., ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice 2003).
12. See Joanne Constantino et al., Concern With Private and Public Rights, 2 AM. JUR.
2D Administrative Law § 2 (2002) (defining the exercise of private rights through the
Executive branch as defined by the Legislative branch while not intruding on the
constitutional domain of the Judicial branch); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264
(1970) (holding that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing is required before public
assistance benefits can be cut); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 394 U.S. 970 (1969) (mem.)
(noting probable jurisdiction where the adequacy of an informal conference prior to the
termination of welfare benefits was at issue); Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (finding that the court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's constitutional claim
regarding the termination of his veteran's benefits without notice); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.
Supp. 893, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that the proposed termination of welfare benefits
requires the determination of adjudicative facts); CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW & PRACTICE § 11.10 (1997 & Supp. 2d 2003-04) (explaining the general principles of
administrative adjudication).
13. See A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION, supra note 11 (explaining the
1100 [56:4
REEXAMINING DECLARATORY ORDERS
Although adjudication by executive branch agencies was once
controversial,' 4 the Supreme Court approved it in 1932,5 and it is now a
familiar activity of most administrative agencies,1 6 both in the "formal" and
"informal" varieties. 7
Agencies' adoption of the judicial model of decisionmaking through
adjudication has not, however, been complete. Generally included in a
court's arsenal of judicial authority is the power to grant declaratory
relief.18 For many years, courts have willingly exercised their declaratory
authority where sufficient justification exists. This largely equitable action
might include injunctive relief 9 or some other action that may not
necessitate a full trial or hearing.
Agencies similarly possess the discretionary authority to "issue a
declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty. '20 Yet,
despite the Supreme Court's approval of this method, 21 and its significant
processes of adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act); see also Michael Cox,
The Model Adjudication Rules (M4Rs), 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 75 (1994) (presenting the
MARs as submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United States).
14. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996)
(chronicling the contentious history leading to the passage of the Administrative Procedure
Act); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10
ADMrN. L. J. AM. U. 65, 65-68 (1996) (emphasizing that a controversy regarding formal
administrative adjudication played an important part in the original drafting of the bill that
would become the Administrative Procedure Act).
15. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
16. Compare Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform:
Studies in the Neglect and Abuse ofAdministrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 405, 412 (1995-
96) (discussing the widespread availability and use of administrative adjudication), with
Jerry L. Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospect for Artisans in the
Age of Robots, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1055, 1055-56 (1992) (pointing out that "adjudication, at
least in the form of adversary, trial type proceedings, is profoundly anti-bureaucratic.").
17. See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54
STAN. L. REv. 87, 94 (2001) and Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication
Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 (1975-76) (describing the use of informal adjudicatory
actions as described by the Administrative Procedure Act); see also Jim Rossi, Respecting
Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1105, 1116 (2001) (discussing formal adjudications as implemented by the
Environmental Protection Agency); Rev. John J. Coughlin, O.F.M., A Comparison of the
Administrative Law of the Catholic Church and the United States, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 81,
82 (2000-01) (comparing different adjudication methods implemented in the United States).
But see Lubbers, supra note 14, at 70-74 (discussing how federal agencies have "drifted"
away from formal adjudication, using ALJs in favor of less formal "non-AL" adjudication).
18. See the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000) (noting that such
declarations will have the effect of a final judgment, subject to normal review).
19. See id. § 2202; see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 499 (1969) (holding
that "[a] declaratory judgment can [] be used as a predicate to further relief, including an
injunction").
20. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2000).
21. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973)
(upholding FDA authority to use a declaratory order to remove uncertainty over whether a
particular drug is a "new drug"); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 367-
73 (1969) (upholding an FCC declaratory order imposing "equal time" obligations on
broadcast stations).
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use by federal regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) 22 and the former Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),23 many
agencies have made little use of this procedural tool.
24
An agency may issue a declaratory order on its own initiative or at the
request of a petitioner. When issued, declaratory orders are as binding and
judicially reviewable "as like orders," but whether to issue one is within the
discretion of the agency.25 In this respect, petitions to issue a declaratory
order resemble petitions to initiate a rulemaking under § 553(e) of the
APA.26
The fact that the declaratory order provision falls within the formal
adjudication section of the APA (§ 554) would seemingly require agencies
to use formal adjudicatory procedures to issue such an order.27 In many
such proceedings, however, the facts are not in dispute; therefore, the
agency can use a summary decision process. Moreover, in recent years,
numerous courts have upheld agency declaratory orders issued after more
informal "paper hearing" processes that are not significantly different from
28the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
22. The FTC has issued declaratory orders on occasion. See AMREP Corp., 100 F.T.C.
488, 488 (1982) (demonstrating jurisdictional findings and order issued pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(e)); see also Chesebrough-Ponds. Inc., 66 F.T.C. 252, 266 (1964) (finding that a
cease-and-desist order was not appropriate where respondents had immediately discontinued
the disputed practice when challenged by the FTC but, at respondents request at oral
argument, the agency issued an order under § 554(e) to declare its view of what the law
required); Tavlor-Friedsam Co., 69 F.T.C. 483, 502 (1966) (Comm'r Elman, dissenting)
(asserting that the Commission should have issued a declaratory order as an alternative to a
cease-and-desist order).
23. See West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Am. Indus., Inc., 893 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding the defendant's request for and reliance on ICC's declaratory order declaring
basis for plaintiffs law suit contrary to law upheld); Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., v. ICC,
5 F.3d 911 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding a series of ICC declaratory orders). Both cases are
discussed below.
24. See Powell I, supra note 2, at 373 (1985) (speculating that this is because in many
situations, regulatory agencies are reluctant to afford immunity on potential wrongdoers by
defining the boundaries of permissible conduct).
25. See Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 703 F.2d 447, 452 (10th Cir. 1983)
(upholding the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission's denial of a
declaratory order, and recognizing that in exercising its discretion, the agency provided
reasonable justifications for the denial).
26. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) ("Each agency shall give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.").
27. The Attorney General's Manual on the APA so presumes: "This grant of authority
to the agencies to issue declaratory orders is limited by the introductory clause of section
[554] so that such declaratory orders are authorized only with respect to matters which are
required by statute to be determined 'on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing."' Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) at 59,
reprinted in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK (William F. Funk et al.
ed., ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice 3d ed. 2000).
28. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 796-97 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the declarative order was properly issued after an informal adjudication
process that included a form of note and comment); see also Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc.,
5 F.3d at 914-15 (finding that an agency declaratory order, issued after it "requested and
reviewed numerous comments," was not arbitrary or capricious); Texas v. United States,
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Similar to the Declaratory Judgment Act, the declaratory order provision
was included in the APA to develop predictability by authorizing binding
determinations "which dispose of legal controversies without the necessity
of any party's acting at his peril upon his own view." 29 Shortly after the
enactment of the APA, Professor Kenneth Davis saw the potential of
declaratory orders. He provided the example of the Federal
Communication Commission's (FCC's) efforts to regulate radio
programming as an arena for its use. Today, as the FCC seemingly enters
into a new era of broadcast regulation,3° Davis's insight seems more
relevant than ever:
The declaratory order may be even better suited to regulation of radio
programs than the cease-and-desist order. The declaratory order may be
either affirmative or negative, whereas the cease-and-desist order is
866 F.2d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the APA's hearing requirements were
satisfied without providing for a formal oral hearing and the cross-examination of
witnesses).
29. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 30 (1941). The two leading drafters of the APA wrote in the 1940s of the need
for a mechanism to declare the legality of planned commercial actions. See Walter
Gellhom, Declaratory Rulings by Federal Agencies, 221 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 153
(1942), and Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting,
Advising, Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 HARV. L. REv. 193, 228-34 (1949)
(urging greater agency use of declaratory orders).
30. The FCC has recently commenced review of, and possible sanctions for, sensational
programs that allegedly violate standards of indecency. Regarding litigation involving
Howard Stem, see In re Infinity Broad. Operations, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 5032 (Mar. 8, 2004)
(finding Infinity Broadcasting apparently liable for $27,500 for airing material during the
Howard Stern Show (radio broadcast July 26, 2001) that violated restrictions against the
broadcast of indecent materials); see FCC Finds That Broadcast of "F-Word" During
Golden Globe Awards Was Indecent and Profane (Federal Communications Commission),
Mar. 18, 2004, at 1 (reporting that the FCC issued an order concluding that the live
broadcast of the phrase "f***ing brilliant" during Golden Globe Awards 2003 was in
violation of statutory prohibitions against indecency and profanity), available at http://hrau-
nfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-245133A1.pdf; FCC Affirms Forfeiture
Against Emmis for Violation of Indecency Rules (Federal Communications Commission),
Apr. 8, 2004, at 1 (reporting that the F.C.C. affirmed a $14,000 fine against Emmis Radio
License Corporation for willfully broadcasting indecent material on the "Mancow's
Morning Madness" program), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocspublic/attach
match/DOC-245908Al.pdf; In re Clear Channel Broad. Licensees, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 6773
(2004) (finding three Clear Channel subsidiaries apparently liable for $495,000 for willfully
and repeatedly airing program material during two segments of the Howard Stern Show
(radio broadcast Apr. 9, 2003) that violated federal restrictions on the broadcast of indecent
material); Commission Proposes Statutory Maximum Fine of $495, 000 Against Subsidiaries
of Clear Channel Communications, Inc. For Apparent Multiple Violations of Indecency
Rules (Federal Communications Commission), Apr. 8, 2004 (reporting that the FCC's April
8, 2004 Notice of Apparent Liability against Clear Channel suggests the statutory maximum
fine available for the violations and constitutes the first time in which the Commission
imposed fines based on separate utterances), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspub
lic/attachmatch/DOC-245911Al.pdf). For a description of the possible FCC sanction for
Janet Jackson's alleged "wardrobe malfunction," see FCC Chairman Powell Calls Super
Bowl Halftime Show a 'Classless, Crass, Deplorable Stunt' (Federal Communications
Commission), February 2, 2004, at 1 (reporting that FCC Chairman Michael Powell has




necessarily negative . .. . They may be issued on the application of
private parties or through proceedings instituted by the Commission on
its own motion .... In every respect the declaratory order gives promise
of being a thoroughly satisfactory procedural device for the regulation of
radio programs; its use would assure appropriate procedural safeguards,
opportunity for judicial review, and relief from the rigidity of deprivation
of licenses as the sole sanction.
3 1
Davis's enthusiasm was tempered by his caution that he was being
circumspect in his proposal, limiting it to the suggestion that in the many
situations where the Commission wishes to state its policy, declaratory
orders can be more useful than advisory opinions, dicta, announcements or
opinion letters.32
But despite Davis's early enthusiasm for the prudent use of declaratory
orders and the commonplace nature of the declaratory judgment actions by
Article III courts, agencies and interested parties have been slow to warm
to the procedure. In fact, few scholars have followed Professor Powell to
inquire into this seeming aversion.33
B. The Use of Declaratory Orders by Federal Agencies to Expedite the
Resolution of Jurisdictional Disputes
Given the procedural simplicity of issuing declaratory orders, it is
surprising that federal agencies are reluctant to issue them. When
employed prudently, these orders can expeditiously resolve preliminary,
yet foundational, issues related to jurisdiction in the context of
adjudication.
Jurisprudential disputes often arise when potential targets of enforcement
actions seek reassurance that they are not covered by a particular agency
statute or regulation. The proactive use of declaratory orders by federal
agencies could resolve these matters quickly and efficiently.
Professor Powell provided a concrete example of a situation where a
declaratory order proceeding would have been more efficient for both
parties than an enforcement adjudication. In that case, the court of appeals,
three years after the alleged illegal conduct, held that the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) had abused its
31. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising,
Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 HARV. L. REv. 193, 203-04 (1950) (footnotes
omitted).
32. See id. at 204.
33. But see Randolph May's series of articles suggesting that the FCC make greater use
of declaratory orders instead of rulemaking in certain situations, infra, notes 57-61.
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discretion in applying a regulation to a company's conduct.34 Powell
observed that:
Issuance of a declaratory order would have provided a more efficient
way to resolve the dispute. If Phelps Dodge had obtained a declaratory
order, the dispute, which involved no contested issues of fact, could have
gone directly from the Commission to the court of appeals. The matter
could have been resolved in six months. An alternative scenario is also
conceivable. If Phelps Dodge had anticipated the Commission's
enforcement action, the corporation could have asked for an immediate
declaration whether the regulation in question applied to the practices
challenged by the Commission. If such a request for a declaratory order
had been made and granted, the parties' legal fees and time costs would
have been greatly reduced.35
Powell's example of FMSHRC's enforcement against Phelps Dodge
presents several salient points. The concerned party may face potential
losses or liability if she waits for administrative action that might answer or
resolve the controversy. The balance, however, has shifted after the
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning Court's sanction of the use of declaratory
orders in conjunction with administrative summary judgment. Armed with
newly highlighted authority to terminate adjudications on the basis of
evidentiary thresholds-administrative summary judgment-and then to
issue declaratory orders in anticipation of similarly framed disputes,
agencies now have a powerful tool for streamlining adjudications.
Determinations of whether this represents a swing too far in favor of the
agencies, and of the extent to which the strong declaratory order can be
restrained by the APA's limitations against arbitrary and capricious
conduct and abuses of discretion, will require further analysis. Just as
important, at this stage one cannot tell the extent to which other procedural
devices also might be coupled with the declaratory order.3 6 If the party
attempts to challenge the unclear policy directly in an Article III court, she
risks summary dismissal on the basis of standing, ripeness, or exhaustion of
remedies. In such cases, a petition that seeks to compel the agency to
determine the jurisdictional question might benefit both the concerned
party and the agency, which may ultimately benefit from judicial
endorsement of its jurisdiction over the matter.
Several cases decided after publication of Professor Powell's articles
well illustrate the creative use of petitions for 'declaratory orders by
34. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 681 F.2d
1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that an agency safety rule pertaining to hazards of
electrical shocks was incorrectly applied to hazards attendant to removal of rocks from a
chute).
35. Powell II, supra note 2, at 288.
36. Id. (discussing the declaratory order's efficiency in eliminating other uncertainties
in the case that would normally be left to be determined in the hearing).
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regulated parties. In the first case, 37 a trucking company (West Coast) sued
another company (American Industries) to recover "undercharges ' '38 on its
shipment. American Industries asserted that the recovery of undercharges
violated federal law, and asked the district court to refer the issue to the
ICC. The court declined to formally refer the issue, but stayed the
proceedings to allow American Industries to file a petition for a declaratory
order with the ICC. It did so, and the ICC ruled in American Industries'
favor. The district court then dismissed West Coast's suit without
prejudice on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to review the ICC's
order. The Ninth Circuit first reviewed the district court's initial
determination to stay the proceedings, and found it appropriate under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The court then found that, because the
declaratory order was a final order reviewable directly in the court of
appeals, and the time limit for such review had passed, the ICC order was
no longer reviewable. The Ninth Circuit then decided that, under principles
of res judicata (namely, that the agency was acting in a judicial capacity
and the issue presented was actually litigated before the agency), the ICC's
order had preclusive effect and the district court should grant summary
judgment to American Industries.
In another ICC case, 39 an Association of Texas Warehousemen was
concerned about a ruling of the Texas Railroad Commission concerning
out-of-state shipments temporarily stored in Texas warehouses and then
shipped to another Texas location. The state agency explained that it
considered the second leg of the shipment to be within its jurisdiction
because that leg did not constitute interstate commerce. The Association,
fearing state rate regulation, petitioned the ICC for a declaratory order
declaring that the entire shipment (both legs) was interstate. The ICC first
found that the risk of imminent enforcement by the Texas agency presented
enough of a controversy to warrant instituting a § 554(e) proceeding. The
ICC then issued an order describing in some detail the nature of such
shipments, and ruled that they were interstate. The Texas agency and some
state trucking associations petitioned for review. They first argued that the
ICC's declaratory order was "impermissibly broad' 4° and that it was a:
[G]eneralized, global declaration of interstate jurisdiction based on an
overly broad and vague record... [and that it] implicates an unknown
multitude of shippers, carriers, products, and shipping patterns and that
37. West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Am. Indus., Inc., 893 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1990).
38. See id. at 230 (defining undercharges as "the difference between the rate [West
Coast] filed with the ICC and the lower figure it negotiated with and collected from
American Industries").
39. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911 (5th Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 915.
1106 [56:4
REEXAMINING DECLARATORY ORDERS
the breadth of the order therefore makes any determination of shipper
intent impossible.
4 1
The court rejected this argument, explaining that the agency had not
abused its broad discretion to grant or decline declaratory relief. In
reviewing the merits, the court found the order to be adjudicatory,42 with a
record that supported the order. The court stated:
Petitioners misunderstand the nature of the ICC's order. The declaratory
order simply 'determine[s] the legal consequences of the factual
predicate presented' by the warehousemen. The order would not insulate
the warehousemen from a state regulatory proceeding if facts are
presented which are different from those assumed in the declaratory
order.
43
A DOT case, American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,4 4
involved the use of Dallas' Love Field to serve as an airport for interstate
service. A 1980 federal law banned most interstate service from Love
Field. One of several exceptions to this law allowed commuter service that
employed the use of an aircraft with a passenger capacity of no more than
fifty-six passengers. Congress later made clear that this could include
service by planes (below 300,000 pounds) that had been reconfigured to
include only fifty-six or fewer seats. Various carriers proposed long haul
service with such planes, and the city of Fort Worth sued in state court to
block the service. While the state suit was pending, the city of Dallas filed
a federal suit against DOT and Fort Worth requesting declaratory relief on
essentially the same issues involved in the state action.
At the urging of several of the parties, and while both the federal and
state actions were pending, DOT initiated a declaratory order proceeding,
informing the parties that it intended to rule on the "federal law issues,"
and allowing the parties an opportunity to submit comments (later
extended) on these issues. After extending the comment period, DOT
ultimately issued a declaratory order that resolved five questions it had set
forth, and basically upheld the rights of the applicants to provide the new
service, within the parameters of the federal restrictions. The Fifth Circuit
upheld the order against various procedural and substantive challenges.
The ICC and DOT cases described above document the utility of
declaratory orders. In each case, the regulated parties secured their
individual interests and simultaneously furthered the interest of the
regulating agency that sought judicial endorsement of its jurisdiction.
In addition to these ICC and DOT cases, there are other, more
41. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
42. See id. at 916-17 & n.9 (defining adjudication as the process of an agency resolving
certain issues presented by petitioners in a specific factual context).
43. Id. at 918 (citations omitted).
44. 202 F.3d at 788.
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contemporary controversies that illustrate the flexibility of the declaratory
process. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), an agency
within the U.S. Department of the Treasury, enforces the federal statute
that authorizes national banks' real estate lending activities. This statute
provides that "[a]ny national banking association may make, arrange,
purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in
real estate, subject to . . . such restrictions and requirements as the
Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or order.,
45
Recently, some states became concerned that the OCC was not doing
enough to enforce against predatory lending practices, and enacted stronger
fair lending statutes. A leading example is the Georgia Fair Lending Act
(GFLA) enacted in October 2002,46 which "restricts the ability of creditors
or servicers to charge certain fees and engage in certain practices for three
categories of loans defined by the GFLA: 'home loans,' 'covered home
loans,' and 'high-cost home loans. ,47
In January 2003, National City Bank of Indiana requested a
"determination or order" that the GFLA does not apply to National City
because the state law is preempted by the OCC's statutory and regulatory
authority over national banks. OCC's response was quite interesting. First,
it issued two advisory letters setting forth standards "that should assure that
national banks are not directly involved, or indirectly associated with,
predatory or abusive lending practices." The OCC also published a
"Notice of Request for Preemption Determination or Order" in the Federal
48Register and requested comments.
Six months later, on August 5, 2003, after receiving 76 comments, the
OCC issued its "Preemption Determination and Order, 'A9 which concluded
"that the provisions of the GFLA affecting national banks' real estate
lending are preempted by Federal law."50 Therefore, the OCC issued "an
order providing that the GFLA does not apply to National City or to any
other national bank or national bank operating subsidiary that engages in
real estate lending activities in Georgia.,
51
The OCC noted, however, that it declined to make a broader ruling,
which National City requested, to address "whether Federal law occupies
the field of real estate lending regulation, such that no state real estate
45. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000).
46. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1-13 (2004).
47. This description is from OCC's Notice of Request for Preemption Determination or
Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 8959 (Feb. 26, 2003).
48. Id. (creating a 30-day comment period as requested by National City Bank, NA and
its subsidiaries).





lending law applies to national banks or their operating subsidiaries. 5 2
The OCC explained:
[O]ur Determination and Order does not take up that issue. National
City's request asked us to review only one state's law, the GFLA. A
conclusion that Federal law occupies the field of real estate lending
regulation would have implications beyond the applicability of the
Georgia law. For that reason, we believe it is appropriate to consider the
question of occupation of the field, as that theory may apply in the case
of real estate lending, in a rulemaking. Contemporaneously with the
issuance of this Determination and Order, therefore, we are initiating a
rulemaking that addresses that issue.
53
In issuing the order, the OCC asserted that it was "expressly authorized
by [12 U.S.C. § 371],,,54 quoted above. The agency, however, also cited 5
U.S.C. § 554(e). In doing so, the OCC argued that "considerable case law
and agency practice of issuing orders" supported their view that no
opportunity for a hearing was required. 5
Interestingly, one interested party argued that the issuance of the
order/determination should be delayed because the agency failed to meet
the requirements of Executive Order 13,132, which requires
intergovernmental consultation in a rulemaking if a rule preempts state law.
The OCC seemed to accept that the Executive Order applied to its issuance,
but claimed that "the consultative process [required by the Executive
Order] ha[s] been met by our solicitation (and receipt) of comment from
interested parties.
', 56
Another example of the potential utility of the declaratory order is
presented by the ongoing debate in the FCC over whether and how "Voice-
over Internet Protocol" (VoIP) (often called "internet telephony") services
should be regulated. As Randolph May has written, "[t]his is an important
public-policy question with ramifications for the telecom industry's future
as well as for our nation's economy. 57 In this situation, regulated parties
have sought to invoke the declaratory order process, but the FCC may
prefer a broader inquiry. May has reported that the FCC is presently
considering four separate petitions for declaratory orders on aspects of this
issue. One is from an internet telephony company that seeks a ruling that
its service is not a regulated communications service, but rather an
52. Id. at 46,265.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 46,281.
55. 68 Fed. Reg. at46,281 n.113.
56. Id. at 46,281; see also Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 803-04 (finding that NEPA applied
to a DOT declaratory order, but that an environmental impact statement was not required in
the circumstances presented).
57. Randolph J. May, The Metaphysics of VoIP, CNET NEWS.COM, available at
http://news.com. com/2102-7352 3-5134896.html. (last modified Jan. 5, 2004).
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unregulated information service. Another is from a broadband-based VolP
service seeking a similar ruling. Two others are from larger long-distance
providers seeking a declaration that calls made on regular phones that
travel in part over facilities using the Internet be exempted from access
charges normally paid to local phone companies.58
May points out that the FCC's response has been an announcement "that
[the agency] intends very soon to open a comprehensive new rulemaking
proceeding with the idea of developing an overall regulatory framework for
VoIP. ' '59 He concludes that this may not be the best way for the FCC to
proceed:
In theory, this may sound good: Rather than make decisions about
various VoIP issues in an ad hoc fashion, think globally!
Here's the rub: While broad, generic rules often make sense for
establishing new policies applicable to an entire industry, in this
instance, this approach probably won't work well.
Consistent with its recent practice, commission officials have indicated
that the rule-making notice, soliciting public comment, will be framed in
a very open-ended fashion, covering the entire range of potential issues.
Among them are VoIP's regulatory status; whether access charges,
universal service contributions and taxes apply; whether 911 services
should be mandated; and whether VoIP phones can be tapped by law
enforcement officials. But history has shown that open-ended comment
invitations encourage parties to toss everything but the kitchen sink into
the rule-making stew.
The likely result will be to create a lengthy period of uncertainty.
Opposing interests will have a ready-made forum for continually
offering up new facts-and arguing fresh issues-in an effort to keep the
agency from reaching definitive conclusions that regard all the potential
issues identified.., bringing unfocused regulatory proceedings to a
timely conclusion.
Moreover, an open-ended proceeding fosters a more regulatory outcome
than desirable. With a potpourri of issues up for grabs simultaneously,
the agency's five commissioners, egged on by the various competing
interests, are more likely to engage in horse-trading compromises that
ratchet up the level of regulation-
60
In the end, May concludes that: "One practical way to proceed would be
for the FCC to create a VoIP policy framework simply by deciding on the
individual petitions brought before it in the least regulatory way. By
58. See Randolph J. May, VoIP Regulation: A Plea for Procedural Modesty, CNET
NEWS.COM, available at http://news.com.com/2010-7352-5152699.html (last modified Feb.
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deciding each one narrowly on its merits, the agency is more likely to avoid
regulatory overreaching."
6'
As the cases and examples explained above demonstrate, declaratory
orders potentially can be efficient tools that resolve pivotal issues related to
jurisdiction and preserve resources for litigation of the substantive issues of
a claim. The ensuing efficiency inures to the benefit of the agency, the
individual claimant and, ultimately, the taxpaying public.
62
II. THE PROCESS REQUIRED TO ISSUE DECLARATORY ORDERS UNDER
§ 554(e) OF THE APA
A fundamental question involves the process required to issue a
declaratory order. As mentioned above, the declaratory order provision is
placed in the formal adjudication section of the APA. This has led several
treatise writers to observe that its use is limited to situations "when the
agency decision must be based on a formal trial type hearing.
63
Davis opined that the limitations caused by the statutory placement were
unfortunate and "seem[ed] to have little rational foundation and [we]re
probably the product of inadvertence." 64 In returning to his FCC example,
Davis posed the following hypothetical:
Suppose, for example, a broadcasting station wants to refuse to broadcast
a particular political speech and, since such a refusal is sometimes
61. Id.; see also Randolph J. May, New Rules for New Tech: With emerging Internet
phone services, the FCC should think about going step-by-step, LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 29,
2004) (arguing that the FCC should rely on adjudication rather than rulemaking to set
policies on evolving technologies like the VoIP).
62. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J.
1241, 1245 (1985) (explaining that a declaratory order may also serve as a potential tool to
facilitate an agreement between the agency and a challenger to settle pending litigation over
the legality of a rulemaking); see also Environmental Protection Agency Policy on the
Issuance of Comfort/Status Letters, 62 Fed. Reg. 4624 (Jan. 30, 1997) (stating that it is not
unusual for parties to settle court challenges to agency rulemakings and that in exchange for
the challenger's offer, the agency could agree to issue a declaratory order, a less formal staff
advisory opinion, or a general counsel's letter agreement (sometimes called a "comfort
letter") that pledges not to sanction the challenger for the spelled-out activities).
"Comfort/status letters" are issued by the EPA to interested buyers of potentially
contaminated property. The letters help interested buyers understand the potential for or
actual agency involvement at the respective sites. Id. The informal and low-cost approach
of the declaratory order, advisory opinion, or letter of agreement carries less risk of lengthy
litigation and also secures the challenger's interests.
63. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 181 (4th ed. 1997); see also CHARLES H. KOCH, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.40 (1985) ("Since this provision appears in the section on formal adjudication,
the drafters must have envisaged this devise as auxiliary to formal adjudication."); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.21 (3d ed. 1991) ("The grant of authority to agencies
is limited by the introductory language of the relevant APA section so that declaratory
orders are authorized only with respect to matters that are required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."). This is in accord with
the original view of the Attorney General. See supra note 27.
64. Davis, supra note 31, at 230.
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permissible and sometimes not, it seeks a clarification from the FCC.
The FCC has power to give an advisory opinion, but can it give a
binding determination which will be judicially reviewable? Does the
Communications Act somehow require a hearing with a determination
on the record? The Act requires such a hearing before the Commission
may revoke or refuse to renew a license, and the refusal to broadcast the
speech may be relevant to a license proceeding. But so may it be
relevant to a rule-making proceeding which does not require a hearing.
The declaratory-order proceeding is neither a license proceeding nor a
rule-making proceeding. The Communications Act, having no provision
for a declaratory order, has no provision for a hearing before issuing a
declaratory order. Then must the legality of refusing to broadcast the
speech be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing? The answer is that the question falls into the middle of a
statutory hiatus-the question does not fit the legislative arrangement.
We are therefore forced to turn to the legislative history ....
The Senate Committee, referring to declaratory orders, said: "[S]uch
orders may be issued only where the agency is empowered by statute to
hold hearings and the subject is not expressly exempted by the
introductory clauses of this section." The House Committee made an
almost identical statement ... The conclusion that the FCC may issue a
declaratory ruling in our hypothetical case in spite of the introductory
clause of § [554] is consistent with statutory language, is supported by
legislative history, and is impelled by practical needs.
As demonstrated below, courts have routinely sustained this practical
interpretation.
A. Formal Adjudication Is Not Required
Courts have clearly ruled that agencies may issue binding, judicially
reviewable orders without following all the formalities of APA formal
adjudication.6 6 The agency must, however, engage in some suitable
measure of process to ensure that issued orders are properly granted.
Informal adjudication allows for procedural flexibility, and courts have
65. Id. at 231-32.
66. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373, 380 (1969) (reviewing and
upholding an FCC declaratory order imposin, "eciual time" oblieations on a broadcast
station, although "FCC did not comply with all of the formalities for an adjudicative
proceeding"); see also Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 626, discussed supra note 21; Powell I,
supra note 2, at 359 n.75 (discussing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734 (1978),
and Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956) to illustrate the agencies'
use of a "paper hearing" process, i.e., notice-and-comment procedures, to obtain the views
of affected parties and other interested persons was upheld). See, e.g., Texas v. United
States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding the "paper hearing" provided the




generally been supportive of the use of such procedures to issue declaratory
orders.
Perhaps the most frontal, procedural challenge to a declaratory order
occurred in American Airlines67 the facts of which are discussed in Part
I(A), infra. In American Airlines, the agency had basically provided a
notice-and-comment process. The reviewing court approved the DOT's
"informal adjudication" procedures, despite several challenges based on
inadequate notice, improper ex parte contacts, and failure to treat its
issuance as rulemaking under § 553 notice-and-comment procedures. The
court also accepted the use of informal adjudication procedures without
much discussion.
68
DOT, the court ruled, properly disregarded the APA's notice
requirements for formal adjudications. The court found that, in the absence
of a statute requiring an agency to conduct its adjudication "on the record
after opportunity for agency hearing," an agency could define its own
procedures for conducting an informal adjudication. 69 The court ultimately
concluded that DOT's procedures, which included identification of the
legal issues and the allowance of comments during an extended period, met
the minimum notice requirements for informal adjudications. 70 The court
also found that Fort Worth's challenge of the DOT failure to notify the
parties of its consideration of a factual issue (the effect of increased service
at Love Field on DFW Airport) had no merit.71
The court similarly rejected claims based on improper ex parte contacts
allegations. It noted that the APA's ex parte prohibitions do not cover
informal adjudications. Moreover, the DOT did not violate its own rules
72governing this issue.
Finally, the court rejected the argument that "DOT's order amounts to a
substantive rule subject to the notice and comment provision of § 553. 7
The court, citing the familiar maxim that "(a)gencies have discretion to
67. 202 F.3d at 788.
68. Id. at 796-97 (citations omitted) (stating that DOT issued its declaratory order after
conducting an informal adjudication, pursuant to its authority under 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) to
"'issue a declaratory ruling to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty' (citing 5
U.S.C. § 554(e)); see also Texas, 866 F.2d at 1555 (describing that the declaratory order
"belongs to the genre of adjudicatory ruling").
69, Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 797 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990)).
70. Id. (citing Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 923 (D.C.
Cir. 1982)) (finding a court-inferred requirement of notice and comment "as a necessary
means of carrying out" judicial review).
71. Id. (finding that the formal notice requirement in § 554(b) did not apply, the parties
had effective notice, and Fort Worth had a sufficient opportunity to present evidence).
72. Id. at 798 (noting that communications fall outside of the regulations because they
took place prior to the interpretation proceeding and did not involve the merits of the case).
73. Id. at 797.
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choose between adjudication and rulemaking as a means of setting
policy, ' 74 stated:
In determining whether an agency action constituted adjudication or
rulemaking, we look to the product of the agency action. We also accord
significant deference to an agency's characterization of its own
action.... Since the APA defines "adjudication" as the "agency process
for formulating an order," 5 U.S.C. § 551(7), and DOT classifies its
ruling as a declaratory order, we find that the agency engaged in
adjudication rather than rulemaking. Furthermore, because DOT's order
interpreted the rights of a small number of parties properly before it,
DOT did not abuse its discretion by acting through an adjudicatory
proceeding.75
The DOT and ICC decisions establish that agencies retain considerable
discretion to determine the procedures used to issue declaratory orders.
They further demonstrate Professor Powell's point that "section 554(e) can
free proceedings from the 'strait jacket' of individualized adjudications and
can substantially reduce agency time commitments. 76
B. The Declaratory Order Process Within the Administrative Procedure
Continuum
It is apparent from the cases discussed herein that declaratory order
proceedings have much in common with their policymaking
cousins-rulemaking and informal adjudication. In fact, declaratory orders
fit appropriately within the administrative process continuum. Rulemaking
exists in an informal/formal hybrid, and adjudication varies along an
informal/formal scale as well.77 Thus, both of these decisionmaking
processes establish an administrative process continuum, with informal
procedures at one end and formal procedures on the other. To address
specific factual or policy decisions such as jurisdictional authority, an
agency may use either rulemaking or adjudication, and within the
constraints of applicable statutes, may employ either informal or formal
procedures as established within the administrative continuum. The
selection of procedures that will have the appropriate level of formality
raises several contextual questions: (1) Is the policy being considered a
74. Id.
75. Id. at 797-98 (citing British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 584
F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1978)),
76. Powell I, supra note 2, at 371. Professor Powell found support for this comment in
the Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S.
609, 625-26 (1973).
77. For an early article recognizing this, see Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of
Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258, 322-24 (1978). See also Peter L.
Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466-68 (1992) (conceptualizing
four types of administrative rulemaking that represent varying degrees of formality).
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binding requirement or a non-binding policy statement?; (2) Are there
underlying facts necessary for the analysis?; (3) Are there disputed issues
of material fact necessary to resolve?; (4) Is it important to provide an
opportunity for an oral hearing?; and (5) Is it important for the result to be
accompanied by findings and conclusions and a reasoned decision?
Procedural flexibility, which can respond to the contextual questions
noted above, transforms the declaratory order into a highly effective tool
with tremendous utility. The order functions similarly to a summary
decision issued in a formal agency adjudication, where no material facts are
in dispute. 78  A declaratory order also matches the effectiveness and
informality of an informal adjudication,7 9 an interpretative rule,8° or a rule
of particular applicability (or limited general applicability). 81
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECLARATORY ORDERS
A. Judicial Tolerance of "Preemptive" Declaratory Orders
A review of six significant cases where agency jurisdictional declaratory
orders were upheld reveals a judicial tolerance for such orders and their
preemptive effect on state action. The decisions also uphold the agencies
use of informal procedures in the issuance of such orders.
Three of the cases (including Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC 82)
involved the former Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and rejected
78. See Ernest Gellhorn & William F. Robinson, Jr., Summary Judgment in
Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARv. L. REV. 612 (1970-71) (exploring the possibility of
using summary judgments to reduce delay in administrative adjudications) and James 0.
Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9-26 (1972-
73) (explaining situations in which summary actions pending an adjudicatory hearing are
and are not appropriate).
79. See Warner W. Gardner, The Procedures by Which Informal Action is Taken, 24
ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 166 (1972) (presenting a draft of a future Informal Procedure Act that
might "remove much of the personal and unconfined discretion, much of the simple mistake
of fact, and much of the unexplained and possibly indefensible decision-making which is
encouraged by the [] absence... of even the most rudimentary procedural requirements");
see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
739 (1975-76) (exploring ways for agencies to determine whether the due process
requirements of informal adjudication are being met).
80. See British Caledonian Airways, 584 F.2d at 992 ("In the present case we have,
moreover, the Board's own assertion that its order is purely interpretive, and this contention
in itself is entitled to a significant degree of credence .... While declaratory orders differ
in some respects from interpretive rules, the same rationale should apply equally to an
agency's characterization of one of its rulings as a declaratory order.").
81. See Powell I, supra note 2, at 348-49 (finding that except with respect to
jurisdictional questions, agencies tended to see their advice-giving function as part of their
rulemaking function rather than their adjudicatory procedures). This Article acknowledges
rulemaking's primary role in promulgation or policy of general applicability; the question is
why more individualized disputes are not resolved through declaratory orders.
82. 5 F.3d at 918; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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challenges by the State of Texas. 83 The ICC had issued a declaratory order
to the effect that goods passing through Texas on a portion of a longer trip
moved in interstate commerce, and thus were subject to the ICC's exclusive
jurisdiction-not that of the Texas Railroad Commission. In these cases,
the ICC had instituted declaratory order proceedings by publishing a notice
in the Federal Register providing an opportunity for interested persons to
comment. It denied motions by Texas and competitors for oral hearings
because no material facts were in dispute. In upholding the ICC, the courts
ruled that broad ICC orders preempting state regulation were necessary for
"resolving this controversy or [for] removing this uncertainty created by
the [state] regulation., 84  Challenges to the agency's fact finding were
denied because "[t]he declaratory order simply 'determines the legal
consequences of the factual predicate presented"' by the parties. 85 "Paper
hearing[s]"-i.e., written comments submitted on a public record-were
held to be sufficient for the issuance of these declaratory orders.86
Courts upheld preemptive declaratory orders in three other specific
cases-two involving the FCC. In State Corporation Commission of State
of Kansas v. FCC,8 7 the Florida Public Service Commission required
Southern Bell to use a sampling period for determining costs that was
different from that used by the FCC. Southern Bell petitioned the FCC for
a declaratory ruling under the FCC rules to preempt the state commission's
action. Notice was published in the Federal Register and a written
comment period was provided. The FCC granted the petition and ordered
that its sampling method was exclusive and preempted any contrary state
rule. In upholding this procedure, the court found that the agency's
discretion to choose rulemaking or adjudication also applied to preemption
decisions.88
In the second FCC case, Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp.,89 the court similarly
upheld a declaratory order, issued sua sponte, asserting the agency's
exclusive authority to rule on complaints by political candidates who had
filed suit in federal court to recover overcharges by television stations for
their political advertising. The court squarely rejected the contention that
83. The other two are Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546 (5th Cir. 1989), and Ctr.
Freight Lines v. ICC, 899 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1990).
84. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 1993).
85. Id. (citing Texas, 866 F.2d at 1551).
86. Texas, 866 F.2d at 1555.
87. 787 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1986).
88. See id. at 1428 (finding that, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent,
the FCC had the authority to issue a declaratory ruling without a record after an opportunity
for an agency hearing).
89. 87 F.3d 393 (9th Cir. 1996).
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the order was invalid because it was not issued using formal adjudicative
procedures. 90
Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) declaratory order in California ex rel. Water
Resources Board v. FERC.9' The Commission determined that it had
exclusive jurisdiction over the setting of water flow rates for a
hydroelectric power project and ruled that state permits for the project that
affected the water supply were preempted. The State of California then
moved to intervene in order to request a rehearing before FERC. FERC
granted the motion to intervene but denied the rehearing request, and the
court of appeals upheld the declaratory order on the merits because
"[c]hanging the flow rates in such a significant fashion would directly
affect the project's ability to run its turbines and generate electricity at the
level stated in the FERC license."
92
These cases confirm that reviewing courts are not only prepared to
accept the broad discretion of regulatory agencies in issuing (or declining
to issue) declaratory orders, but are also quite tolerant of the informal
procedures used to issue them. Moreover, although declaratory order
proceedings usually involve named parties, courts have routinely upheld
orders that have an effect on others who have had an opportunity to
participate in the proceeding.93 Attempts to overturn declaratory orders on
the basis that the agency avoided APA formal adjudication or APA
rulemaking procedures also have not succeeded. 94 The seeming judicial
acceptance of declaratory orders confirms their utility, particularly in
matters where jurisdiction is at issue.
90. Id. at 397 (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609,
625-26 (1973) as holding that "an agency need not conduct an individualized hearing and
adjudication before issuing a declaratory ruling under 5 U.S.C. § 554(e)").
91. 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989).
92. Id. at 749. It is unclear from the opinion what type of procedure FERC used to
issue this declaratory order. In any event, the procedures were not challenged. Id.
93. See Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding the FCC
declaratory order, issued sua sponte, binding on political candidates not named as parties)
(citing Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956) (ICC declaratory order
applicable to all carriers, not just parties to the administrative proceeding)). Professor Levin
suggests that the courts in Wilson and Frozen Food Express were mistaken in referring to
the agency actions as "orders," and that they were really "policy statements" because there
were no named parties and notice-and-comment procedures were used. E-mails to authors
from Ronald Levin, May 18 & 19, 2004. As such, they may not be legally binding on non-
parties. Nevertheless, he agrees that non-parties are "affected" because the Supremacy
Clause, in effect, means that a lawful order of a federal agency in favor of federal
preemption would allow covered companies to ignore state regulatory authorities, those
challenging the federal order would have to intervene in the federal proceedings or "forever
hold their peace." Id., May 19, 2004.
94. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. FCC, 672 F.2d 1034, 1042 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The choice
between rule-making or declaratory order is primarily one for the agency regardless of
whether the decision may affect policy and have general prospective application."); see also
British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. CAB, 584 F.2d at 992-93.
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B. Other Issues Related to Judicial Review
A declaratory order would normally constitute a final, reviewable agency
action. This is in contradiction to many interpretative rules, which may not
meet current tests for "ripeness" of review. 95 Powell, in fact, points to this
disparity in explaining some agencies' preference for use of rulemaking
instead of declaratory orders. 96 An agency's decision to issue a declaratory
order may, however, raise lingering questions regarding venue and
deference.
1. Venue Issues
Some statutes provide for direct judicial review of certain types of
enumerated agency actions. For example, the Clean Water Act provides
for direct judicial review in the courts of appeals (enforced by a 120 day
time limit) of various types of EPA performance standards, effluent
standards and prohibitions, effluent limitations, permit decisions, or
determinations concerning state permit programs. 97 Pending litigation98
has, for example, raised the question whether the listing of cyanide as a
listed toxic pollutant under the Act embraced a particular type of ferric
ferrocyanide. Pursuant to a federal court's referral under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, 99 and after eight years of deliberation, the EPA issued
a "determination" that the listing did include this particular type of
ferrocyanide. When the EPA determination was challenged in the First
Circuit, however, the government moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the "determination" was not
one of the listed actions subject to review directly in the court of appeals.'°
This case illustrates how venue statutes may overlook declaratory orders
and lead to confusion about the proper venue for review. This problem is
95. See ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that
"[i]nterpretive rules as a general matter raise ripeness concerns, given that questions often
arise as to the binding effect of the rule, the absence of immediate enforcement, and the
need for further factual development.").
96. See Powell I, supra note 2, at 356-57.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2000).
98. Narragansett Elec. Co. v. EPA, Case No. 04-1127 (1st Cir. 2004).
99. The First Circuit ordered the referral on October 6, 1995 in Massachusetts. v.
Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 983 (1st Cir. 1995). The EPA issued its
"determination" exactly eight years later. Final Administrative Determination Document on
the Question of Whether Ferric Ferrocyanide is One of the "Cyanides" Within the Meaning
of the List of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 57,690, 57,691
(Oct. 6, 2003) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 401.15, 40 C.F.R. 302.4, and table 302.4 at 40 C.F.R.
302.4) (issuing of the EPA's "determination"). The case arose under CERCLA, but the
issue of whether the ferrocyanide is a hazardous substance subject to CERCLA's liability
rules depends on whether it is a toxic pollutant under the Clean Water Act. Id.
100. Respondent EPA's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, (filed
Mar. 25, 2004), Narragansett Elec. Co., Case No. 04-1127.
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compounded if the governing statute specifies a time limit or precludes
future review.
2. Chevron Deference
As previously noted, agencies possess considerable discretion in the
choice of procedures used to issue a declaratory order. One might initially
assume that, absent some unreasonable interpretation by the agency, courts
would defer to the agency's choice of procedure. The Supreme Court's
jurisprudence confirms that Chevron deferencel°l should normally be
granted to an agency's interpretation of its own statute when that
interpretation is "embodied in a rule that has the force of law" or "was
developed in the course of formal adjudication.
10 2
Deference becomes questionable, however, when the interpretation was
issued in the course of an informal agency adjudication. The ABA has
summarized the caselaw on this point, stating that Chevron deference
applies to informal adjudications if "the agency's conferred authority and
other statutory circumstances demonstrate that 'Congress would expect the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law' in taking such action."
10 3
How this test would be applied to an agency that issues a declaratory order
pursuant to § 554(e) remains to be seen. In Mead itself (which involved a
particular statute authorizing the Customs Service to issue classification
rulings), Chevron deference was denied.
104
The Mead decision at least implies that use of a notice-and-comment
process would help the agency receive Chevron deference. The true issue,
however, should boil down to whether the agency has the authority to make
definitive interpretations. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit in the American
Airlines case, which approved DOT's use of informal adjudication
101. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard to be used by courts
reviewing an agency's construction of the statute it is charged with administering:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
102. ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, A Blackletter
Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 38 (2002).
103. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).
104. 533 U.S. at 231 (stating that "[t]he authorization for classification rulings, and
Customs's practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from notice-and-
comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress
ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here").
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procedures to issue a declaratory order, granted Chevron deference to its
statutory interpretation without any hesitation or comment on the nature of
the procedure used by the agency.105
C. Judicial Review of Petitions for a Declaratory Order
Professor Davis noted in 1949 that declaratory orders, like other orders,
would be judicially reviewable. He was, however, less sure about the
reviewability of denials of petitions for declaratory orders. He points out:
The Act provides that the agency may "in its sound discretion" issue a
declaratory order. A Senate Committee Print states that the phrase
"sound discretion" means "a reviewable discretion and will prevent
agencies from either giving improvident declaratory orders or arbitrarily
withholding such orders in proper cases." But committee reports of both
House and Senate say merely: 'Sound discretion' . . would preclude the
issuance of improvident orders."
The desirability of using declaratory orders in appropriate cases and the
apparent reluctance of some agencies even to consider them might
support an argument in favor of judicial review of a refusal to issue such
an order. 
106
Of course, Professor Davis's commentary long preceded the developments
in the area of judicial review of agency discretionary action.
In the one case that has directly opined on the matter, Coalition for a
Healthy California v. FCC,°7 the Ninth Circuit opined that an agency's
failure to issue a declaratory order could be reviewable. This statement,
however, was dictum because the petitioner had asked the court to issue
such an order itself in lieu of the agency's inaction. 10
This decision generally conforms to established case law regarding the
reviewability of an agency's actions or inactions on petitions for
rulemaking. It would seem that the same considerations apply to the
reviewability petitions for declaratory orders.'09 As noted in one of the
leading cases regarding the reviewability of agency denials of petitions for
rulemaking, WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 0 a court will overturn an agency
decision not to institute a rulemaking "only in the rarest and compelling of
105. 202 F.3d at 813.
106. Davis, supra note 31, at 232-33 (citations omitted).
107. 87 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. See id. at 386 (stating that the relief the court might have been able to give, i.e.,
compelling the FCC to issue a declaratory order, was declined by the coalition).
109. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING (3d ed.) 354-
56 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1998) (noting that although agency action or inaction on petitions for
rulemaking is reviewable, courts remain highly deferential to the discretion of the agency).
110. 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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circumstances." ' Such circumstances may be presented if "a significant
factual predicate of a prior decision... (either to promulgate or not to
promulgate specific rules) has been removed,"'1 2 or if the agency was
"mistaken in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to promulgate [the
requested] regulations."
' 1 3
IV. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE DECLARATORY ORDER PROCESS
FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES
A. Deficiencies of the Process Provided in the Federal APA
Section 554(e) of the APA provides only a generalized process for
declaratory orders. It fails to alert petitioners to the right or opportunity to
request a declaratory order to resolve ambiguities in a situation where such
ambiguity may be injurious to the party. Moreover, the vagueness of
process afforded adds to the apparent amorphousness of these orders. As a
result, Congress should consider amending § 554(e) to provide more
definitive procedural guidance.
One of Powell's recommendations could be incorporated here. In his
second article, he recommends that agencies promulgate procedures for
giving advice and issuing declaratory orders. He advocates the adoption of
rules that describe: (1) how to obtain oral and written nonbinding advice
from an agency's local, regional, or national offices; and (2) how to obtain
a judicially reviewable agency adjudicatory determination pursuant to the
declaratory order provision of § 554(e). 14  These rather simple
requirements could supplement the APA's prescriptions for declaratory
orders, as provided in § 554(e).
B. The 1981 Model State APA's Declaratory Order Provision as a
Reformative Model
The 1981 Model State APA provides detailed guidance regarding the use
of declaratory orders and prescribes a clearly defined process for their
issuance. Section 2-103 (Declaratory Orders) of the Model Act, inter alia,
prescribes the specific circumstances in which declaratory orders can be
issued, requirements for an agency to promulgate rules governing the
issuance of these orders, time periods for notice and agency action on
111. Id. at 818.
112. Id. at 819 (citing Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
113. Id. (citing NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir.1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 662,
(1976), and Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1974)).
114. Powell II, supra note 2, at 300.
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petitions, the legal and binding effect of these orders, and the effect of an
agency's inaction on a petition.' 15
This provision of the Model State APA is far more detailed than § 554(e)
of the federal APA and is truer to Professor Powell's admonitions
regarding declaratory orders. Section 2-103 provides precise guidance on
the appropriate use of these orders, and specific procedures required for
their issuances. Congress, which we hope will eventually amend (and
move) § 554(e) to enhance its utility, should consider adoption of language
similar to that in section 2-103.116
CONCLUSION
Since its inception in the APA, the declaratory order has loomed as a
potentially useful procedural tool that can expeditiously resolve ambiguous
or troublesome questions of administrative law. Professor Powell's
seminal articles on the matter clearly acknowledge this potential. He
observes that the declaratory order provision was originally seen as a tool
for the initiator to avoid "the risk of an agency sanction and to allow him to
order his conduct on the basis of a clear understanding of the law.""
7
Despite the administrative efficiency of declaratory orders, he further notes
the agencies' original reluctance to embrace this tool as an efficient
mechanism to resolve disputes and, commensurately, their failure to
prescribe more precise regulatory guidance for their use. 118 He astutely
observes:
The balance, however, has shifted after the Hynson, Westcott & Dunning
Court's sanction of the use of declaratory orders in conjunction with
administrative summary judgment. Armed with newly highlighted
authority to terminate adjudications on the basis of evidentiary
thresholds-administrative summary judgment-and then to issue
declaratory orders in anticipation of similarly framed disputes, agencies
now have available a powerful tool for streamlining adjudications.
115. For the complete text of the provision, see UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 2-103 (1981).
116. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11465.10-11465.70 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004)
(demonstrating that legislative decisionmakers in California have also adopted a more
precise procedure for petitions for orders). Disappointingly, the California provision
appears to have also been largely ignored by the agencies and the public. See Telephone
Interview with Melissa Meith, Chair, California Office of Admin. Hearings (Jan. 9, 2004)
(stating that she neither knew of any such cases filed with her agency nor that the model
regulations required by § 11465.70 had been issued). Meith also noted that under
§ 11465.50(a)(4), denials of such petitions are not judicially reviewable, and that perhaps
agencies were unwilling to adjudicate such petitions (which in California normally requires
a hearing by a central panel ALJ) when they could give advice more informally through
opinion letters or rulemaking). Id. She also hypothesized that the private bar had other less
visible opportunities to affect agency policy-through lobbying, for example. Id.




Determinations of whether this represents a swing too far in favor of the
agencies, and of the extent to which the strong declaratory order can be
restrained by the APA's limitations against arbitrary and capricious
conduct and abuses of discretion, will require further analysis. Just as
important, at this stage one cannot tell the extent to which other
procedural devices also might be coupled with the declaratory order."1
9
As our survey of more contemporary cases indicates, however, the use of
declaratory orders has garnered some increased utility to resolve distinct
questions of law, or even to settle disputed matters such as jurisdiction or
regulatory applicability. Such prudent use not only takes advantage of the
efficiency that declaratory orders offer in the form of informal
decisionmaking, but also minimizes the litigation costs of both the party
and the agency. It would be myopic to suggest that the willingness of some
agencies, such as the former Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Communication Commission, and Department of Transportation, signals a
general embrace of this administrative tool. Many other agencies could
avoid substantial costs by issuing a declaratory order regarding their
jurisdictional or enforcement authority over certain matters. Such orders
can be reviewed expeditiously, without the protracted litigation that
otherwise often engulfs all of the parties.
Our review of the utility of declaratory orders prompts us to agree with,
echo, and modestly embellish Professor Powell's commentary on the
subject. Declaratory orders constitute a highly efficient procedural tool that
agencies should employ to resolve jurisdictional disputes or questions of
regulatory applicability. The relative procedural ease associated with the
issuance of these orders and their attendant expediency potentially benefit
all parties, including the agency. Our endorsement of declaratory orders
within these specific circumstances, however, comes with suggested
modifications that provide more precise guidance for the use of these tools.
This trend has certainly continued with the lower courts' willingness to
allow informal adjudication and notice-and-comment procedures to suffice
in the issuance of declaratory orders.
We share Powell's frustration with "the nomenclature relating to advice
giving." The recommendation he provided twenty years ago has
continuing validity. Agencies should reexamine such ambiguous terms as
"advisory opinions," "jurisdictional opinions," and "declaratory rulings,"
and take great care to distinguish devices designed for interpretative
rulemaking, and devices that determine individual rights. Agencies should
promulgate regulations for both, with rules governing devices that
119. Id.
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determine individual rights, i.e., declaratory orders, falling within an
agency' s adjudicatory procedures.120
Furthermore, we believe the declaratory order provision in the APA
should be amplified and its procedural context clarified. The Model State
APA, which we noted in the previous section of this Article, provides
excellent guidance on this point. Lastly, the basic suggestion that the
declaratory order provision be removed from § 554(e) may be dated, but
has considerable merit.12 1 We suggest that Congress amend the APA to
include a new section that contains more detailed explanation of
applicability and process associated with declaratory orders. As a
minimalist alternative to an amendment of § 554(e), Congress should move
the applicable language in § 554(e) to § 555, and describe with particularity
the procedures required to issue these orders. 
122
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit succinctly
stated in Merchants Fast Motor Lines v. ICC,123 "Congress commits to the
sound discretion of the agency the decision whether to grant requested
declaratory relief."1 24 Hopefully the commentary and suggestions proffered
in this Article will contribute to the prudent exercise of that discretion, and
more universal acceptance of declaratory orders as efficient tools for
specific dispute resolution.
120. Id. at 373-74.
121. See Note, Administrative Declaratory Orders, 13 STAN. L. REv. 307, 320 (1960-61)
("[T]he declaratory order provision should be removed from section [554], and the agencies
be given broad and flexible authority to grant declaratory relief in situations where it is
proper.").
122. One cautionary note may be in order here. Professor Levin points out a potential
fairness problem if an agency were to issue a declaratory order in an informal adjudication
and then seek to use the order to foreclose a subsequent hearing, such as in an enforcement
proceeding where the party would normally have a statutory right to a formal adjudication.
See E-mail from Ronald Levin to authors, May 18, 2004. The problem would not arise if
the agency were to issue the order using formal adjudication procedures. This "choice of
process" issue is somewhat similar to that raised by the Chevron deference concerns
discussed in Part IV.B.2, above.
123. 5 F.3d. at 911.
124. Id. at 915 (citations omitted).
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